Table 3 Privacy evaluation overview: The papers and their corresponding privacy-relevant properties are listed, e.g., which personal data they treat
From: An analysis of privacy preservation in electric vehicle charging
Paper | Use cases | Actors | Personal data | Techniques | Privacy breachesa | Features | Properties | Analyzed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Li et al. (2014) | Registration, Authorization | eMSP, CSO, CS, EV | Personal data, time, EV’s location, charging parameters, amount of charged energy, aggregated energy | Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), one-day use pseudonym, one-day use session keys | (i) Identification of vehicle and exchange of personal data, (ii) Pseudonymous identification via unique token | Dynamic contactless charging, anonymous authentication and charging | Anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability (as long as only CSO, CS collude) | \(\checkmark\) |
Gao et al. (2018) | Registration, Billing | eMSP, CS, EV | Personal data, accounts | Blockchain, PKI | (i) Identification of vehicle and exchange of personal data, (ii) Pseudonymous identification via unique token | Peer-to-peer charging, the CSO and the CS play as one entity | Anonymity, pseudonymity (as long as no actors collude) | \(\checkmark\) |
Mustafa et al. (2015) | Registration, Authorization, Billing, Roaming | eMSP, CSO, CS, EV | Personal data, Charging Time slot (CTS), price, charging grant or rejection, consumption report, charging parameters | Predistributed sets of pseudonymous, tamper-proof smart cards, digital signature, PKI | (i) Identification of vehicle and exchange of personal data | Two-factor authentication, a multi-user EV charging is supported | Anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability (as long as no actors collude) | \(\checkmark\) |
Portela et al. (2013) | Authorization, Smart charging | DSO, eMSP, CSO, CS, EV | ID of EV user, one time charging session ID, SoC, requested amount of kilometers or energy, time of departure. | Methods: minimize, separate, aggregate, and hide one-time session key | (iii) De-pseudonymization due to data exchange, (iv)Fingerprinting of the EV, (v) Profiling with smart charging | The location remains hidden for the eMSP, the CSO cannot connect profiles of the same EV user due to one-time charging session ID | Anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability (as long as no actors collude) |  |
Rabieh and Aydogan (2019) | Registration, Authorization, Reservation | eMSP, CSO, CS, EV | Personal data, EV’s data, EV’s group, CTS, charging parameters | K-times anonymous authentication, one-time session key, blind signature, PKI | (i) Identification of vehicle and exchange of personal data | Anonymous authentication and charging, fair reservation mechanism | Anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability (as long as only CSO, CS collude) |  |
Gabay et al. (2019 ) | Registration, Authorization, Billing, Reservation | eMSP, CS, EV | Personal data, EV’s data, CTS, charging station, charging fees | Zero Knowledge Proofs, blockchain smart contracts (Ethereum), pseudonymous addresses | (i) Identification of vehicle and exchange of personal data | The eMSP plays a role of the CSO as well, anonymous authentication and charging via one charging use addresses | Anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability (as long as only eMSP, CS collude) |  |