Table 7 RQ4 (Causes of found faults and failures)

F1

\(\bullet\) Jamming attack—emission of signals within a designated spectrum range creating noise in order to interrupt wireless communication

 F16

\(\bullet\) Power injection into a grid \(\bullet\) abrupt changes in consumption \(\bullet\) voltage variation attack—turning off the energy consumption in some buildings in a neighbourhood, in turn damaging electric appliances in other buildings still connected to the network

F2

\(\bullet\) Spoofing attack combined with broadcasting of forged ARP packets

 F17

\(\bullet\) Dielectric breakdown \(\bullet\) winding distortion caused by short-circuit withstand \(\bullet\) winding and magnetic circuit hot spots \(\bullet\) electrical disturbances \(\bullet\) deterioration of insulation \(\bullet\) lightning \(\bullet\) inadequate maintenance \(\bullet\) loose connections \(\bullet\) overloading \(\bullet\) failure of accessories such as OLTCs (on-load tap changers) \(\bullet\) bushings

F3

\(\bullet\) Sending a large number of messages to which nodes are forced to respond

 F18

\(\bullet\) Joint failures of cables and overhead lines \(\bullet\) failure of one or more phase of circuit breaker \(\bullet\) melting of a fuse or a conductor in one or more phases

F4

\(\bullet\) Sybil attack—presenting numerous identities to other nodes by either forging new identities or stealing legitimate ones

 F19

\(\bullet\) Breakdown of transmission lines or equipment \(\bullet\) ageing of insulation \(\bullet\) deterioration of insulation in generator, transformer and other electrical equipment \(\bullet\) improper installations \(\bullet\) overloading of equipment \(\bullet\) mechanical damage by public \(\bullet\) wind, falling trees or other incidents

F5

\(\bullet\) Flooding a data aggregator with many (unsolicited response) data events from a spoofed or compromised relay in order to make buffering of legitimate critical alerts impossible

 F20

\(\bullet\) Driven by the geoelectric field induced by geomagnetic storms

F6

\(\bullet\) Selective forwarding attack where an attacker incorporates themselves in the data flow path of interest and then controls whether the packets will be forwarded or dropped

 F21

\(\bullet\) During forest fire high-temperature gas, charged particles and ash particles cause significant decrease of the insulation strength of the wire to ground gap, that may lead to flashover of transmission line

F7

\(\bullet\) Failure of hardware or software \(\bullet\) excessive flow table requests that overload or crash the controller \(\bullet\) injected malware into SDN controllers \(\bullet\) failure of a connecting link or failure of the OpenFlow protocol \(\bullet\) faulty application \(\bullet\) programming errors of the controller \(\bullet\) error in control messages \(\bullet\) infinite loops \(\bullet\) resource exhaustion

 F22

\(\bullet\) Icing disaster covering lines with ice \(\bullet\) ice load together with wind load increase the stress of wires \(\bullet\) ageing factor

F8

\(\bullet\) Time synchronization attack—spoofing GPS signals that are used as a time source by misleading GPS receivers to acquire fake GPS signals

 F23

\(\bullet\) Back flash-over when the lightning strikes on a shield wire or tower and the resultant voltage is large enough to cause a flash-over from the tower to the line conductors \(\bullet\) shielding failure when lightning strikes directly on the phase conductor

F9

\(\bullet\) Random noises (nature e.g. weather conditions, faulty nodes) \(\bullet\) false data injection attack \(\bullet\) load redistribution attack \(\bullet\) replay attack \(\bullet\) man-in-the-middle attack

 F24

\(\bullet\) Transmission lines failures like excessive flow through transmission lines, leading to overheating and outage of the lines \(\bullet\) natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, solar flares) \(\bullet\) physical attacks (e.g. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack) \(\bullet\) false control command, false feedback or false meter data injection \(\bullet\) physical components in the power grid taken down \(\bullet\) maintenance works at substations \(\bullet\) relay failure \(\bullet\) voltage collapse \(\bullet\) dynamic instability \(\bullet\) operator error

F10

\(\bullet\) Distribution of the malware worm via USB sticks and local networks; if a targeted controller is found through a complex process of fingerprinting, the rogue code is loaded on the controller

 F25

\(\bullet\) Integration of DER power generations increases short circuit capacity and consequently increases fault current

F11

\(\bullet\) Physical tampering (e.g. strong magnet causing interference, reversing or disconnecting the meters) \(\bullet\) bypassing the meters by directly wiring high-consuming appliances to an external feeder \(\bullet\) cyber-attacks (e.g. gaining privileged access to the meter firmware, tampering with the meter storage, interrupting measurements, intercepting the communication link)

 F26

\(\bullet\) Hurricanes including phenomena such as storm surge and flooding in coastal areas, torrential rains, very strong winds and fallen trees

F12

\(\bullet\) Extracting the private data like time of use of individual electrical appliances from smart meters \(\bullet\) compromising the user authentication data or shared secret values (examples of confidentiality attack with intention of privacy leakage are wiretappers and traffic analyzers)

 F27

\(\bullet\) Weather changes \(\bullet\) forecast error \(\bullet\) disconnection of a DRES such as a wind turbine and solar panel from the grid due to equipment failure

F13

\(\bullet\) Scaling and delay attacks, where the adversary modifies price values or timestamps in data packets during transmissions in vulnerable communication networks \(\bullet\)modification of the smart meters’ internal clocks in case of the delay attack

 F28

\(\bullet\) Frequency deviation of distributed generators

F14

\(\bullet\) Energy deceiving attack - injecting forged energy or link-state information into the energy request and response message among nodes

 F29

\(\bullet\) A decrease of the contact area of the cross-section due to bad joints causes higher resistance and heat loss leading to the deterioration of the connecting point, resulting to a loose connection. \(\bullet\) Ageing effects also increase the risk of fault.

F15

\(\bullet\) Variable loads and unpredictable power generation \(\bullet\) an attack on frequency variation, where an attacker takes control of a substantial number of smart meters in a large geographical area

 F30

\(\bullet\) Heavy loads \(\bullet\) transient impulses of brakes \(\bullet\) dust corrosion