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Table 4 RQ4 (Impacts of found faults and failures)

From: Failure and fault classification for smart grids

F/F

Impacts

F/F

Impacts

F1

\(\bullet\) Impaired network performance of power substation systems can cause delayed delivery of time-critical messages or DoS \(\bullet\) preventing the local controllers from receiving complete data samples for state estimation \(\bullet\) undermined demand-respond system

 F16

\(\bullet\) Major physical and economical damage to the customer \(\bullet\) customers and the electrical company may lose money \(\bullet\) damage to the electrical appliances

F2

\(\bullet\) After shutting down the connections, an attacker can masquerade itself as a monitoring IED and send false close/open messages to switches \(\bullet\) loss of both availability and integrity \(\bullet\) mess-up status of the protection system \(\bullet\) potential loss of power supply for customers

 F17

\(\bullet\) Power outages \(\bullet\) personal and environmental hazards \(\bullet\) expensive re-routing or purchase of power from other suppliers

F3

\(\bullet\) Node exhaustion \(\bullet\) consumption of valuable limited resources

 F18

\(\bullet\) Increase of frequency and voltage \(\bullet\) current reduction \(\bullet\) unbalance of voltages and currents can cause equipment damage \(\bullet\) increased voltage levels may lead to insulation failures and short circuit faults

F4

\(\bullet\) Interferes with many network operations including routing voting, data aggregation and reputation evaluation

 F19

\(\bullet\) Current’s increment can cause equipment overheating: reduced life span of insulation \(\bullet\) fall in voltage and frequency \(\bullet\) fire and explosion in equipment (e.g. transformers, circuit breakers) \(\bullet\) limited power flow

F5

\(\bullet\) Negative impact on the control station’s situational awareness \(\bullet\) significant loss of real events

 F20

\(\bullet\) Half-wave saturation of transformer iron core \(\bullet\) temperature rise and vibration of transformer \(\bullet\) reactive power demand and active power loss \(\bullet\) voltage collapse \(\bullet\) inadequate reactive power capacity, that can lead to destructive accidents, e.g., the damage of power grid equipment

F6

\(\bullet\) Decline in network connectivity and packet delivery

 F21

\(\bullet\) Can lead to block faults of transmission lines

F7

\(\bullet\) Delays of data packets \(\bullet\) network congestions \(\bullet\) packet losses \(\bullet\) packet retransmissions

 F22

\(\bullet\) Power outage

F8

\(\bullet\) Negative impact on the accuracy and effectiveness of many SG functions, e.g., event localization, monitoring voltage stability and fault detection on transmission lines

 F23

\(\bullet\) Damage to the transmission line \(\bullet\) power outage

F9

\(\bullet\) Wrong control decisions and sending false commands conceivably leading to large-scale malfunction \(\bullet\) financial losses \(\bullet\) increase in reported consumption of some nodes, decrease of other nodes

 F24

\(\bullet\) From local impact to a large blackout \(\bullet\) customer electricity service disturbance \(\bullet\) damage to the power grid (e.g. unstable voltage) \(\bullet\) benefiting the attacker (e.g. lower power rates)

F10

\(\bullet\) At the time of attack, legitimate code is halted and isolated from real I/O \(\bullet\) destruction of HW equipment

 F25

\(\bullet\) Exceeding the rating of existing circuit breakers and damaging SG equipment \(\bullet\) voltage sags \(\bullet\) malfunction of protective devices

F11

\(\bullet\) Financial loss to the utility company caused by unpaid energy usage

 F26

\(\bullet\) Complete power outage, possibly long lasting \(\bullet\) damage to power plants, transmission lines, substation components or distribution

F12

\(\bullet\) Potential leakage of customer information \(\bullet\) using private data to deduce personal habits and behaviours of the home’s occupants

 F27

\(\bullet\) Outage of the power grid \(\bullet\) poor power quality

F13

\(\bullet\) Monetary losses for individual victims \(\bullet\) system’s instability leading to price and demand fluctuations \(\bullet\) regional blackouts

 F28

\(\bullet\) Dropped loads \(\bullet\) disconnection of utility power at consumer ends

F14

\(\bullet\) Wasted energy \(\bullet\) increased transmission cost \(\bullet\) energy outages \(\bullet\) imbalance of energy supply \(\bullet\) invalid energy links \(\bullet\) isolation of nodes from the grid in terms of energy supply and demand)

 F29

\(\bullet\) The heat energy generated over long time duration could lead to serious damage to system components \(\bullet\) serious threats to system stability and human safety

F15

\(\bullet\) Destabilization of the electrical network leading to a complete blackout \(\bullet\) large areas without electrical energy \(\bullet\) lack of communications \(\bullet\) lack of heating in the winter \(\bullet\) significant economic losses

 F30

\(\bullet\) Unexpected downtime \(\bullet\) economic losses