F/F | Impacts | F/F | Impacts |
---|---|---|---|
F1 | \(\bullet\) Impaired network performance of power substation systems can cause delayed delivery of time-critical messages or DoS \(\bullet\) preventing the local controllers from receiving complete data samples for state estimation \(\bullet\) undermined demand-respond system | Â F16 | \(\bullet\) Major physical and economical damage to the customer \(\bullet\) customers and the electrical company may lose money \(\bullet\) damage to the electrical appliances |
F2 | \(\bullet\) After shutting down the connections, an attacker can masquerade itself as a monitoring IED and send false close/open messages to switches \(\bullet\) loss of both availability and integrity \(\bullet\) mess-up status of the protection system \(\bullet\) potential loss of power supply for customers | Â F17 | \(\bullet\) Power outages \(\bullet\) personal and environmental hazards \(\bullet\) expensive re-routing or purchase of power from other suppliers |
F3 | \(\bullet\) Node exhaustion \(\bullet\) consumption of valuable limited resources | Â F18 | \(\bullet\) Increase of frequency and voltage \(\bullet\) current reduction \(\bullet\) unbalance of voltages and currents can cause equipment damage \(\bullet\) increased voltage levels may lead to insulation failures and short circuit faults |
F4 | \(\bullet\) Interferes with many network operations including routing voting, data aggregation and reputation evaluation |  F19 | \(\bullet\) Current’s increment can cause equipment overheating: reduced life span of insulation \(\bullet\) fall in voltage and frequency \(\bullet\) fire and explosion in equipment (e.g. transformers, circuit breakers) \(\bullet\) limited power flow |
F5 | \(\bullet\) Negative impact on the control station’s situational awareness \(\bullet\) significant loss of real events |  F20 | \(\bullet\) Half-wave saturation of transformer iron core \(\bullet\) temperature rise and vibration of transformer \(\bullet\) reactive power demand and active power loss \(\bullet\) voltage collapse \(\bullet\) inadequate reactive power capacity, that can lead to destructive accidents, e.g., the damage of power grid equipment |
F6 | \(\bullet\) Decline in network connectivity and packet delivery | Â F21 | \(\bullet\) Can lead to block faults of transmission lines |
F7 | \(\bullet\) Delays of data packets \(\bullet\) network congestions \(\bullet\) packet losses \(\bullet\) packet retransmissions | Â F22 | \(\bullet\) Power outage |
F8 | \(\bullet\) Negative impact on the accuracy and effectiveness of many SG functions, e.g., event localization, monitoring voltage stability and fault detection on transmission lines | Â F23 | \(\bullet\) Damage to the transmission line \(\bullet\) power outage |
F9 | \(\bullet\) Wrong control decisions and sending false commands conceivably leading to large-scale malfunction \(\bullet\) financial losses \(\bullet\) increase in reported consumption of some nodes, decrease of other nodes | Â F24 | \(\bullet\) From local impact to a large blackout \(\bullet\) customer electricity service disturbance \(\bullet\) damage to the power grid (e.g. unstable voltage) \(\bullet\) benefiting the attacker (e.g. lower power rates) |
F10 | \(\bullet\) At the time of attack, legitimate code is halted and isolated from real I/O \(\bullet\) destruction of HW equipment | Â F25 | \(\bullet\) Exceeding the rating of existing circuit breakers and damaging SG equipment \(\bullet\) voltage sags \(\bullet\) malfunction of protective devices |
F11 | \(\bullet\) Financial loss to the utility company caused by unpaid energy usage | Â F26 | \(\bullet\) Complete power outage, possibly long lasting \(\bullet\) damage to power plants, transmission lines, substation components or distribution |
F12 | \(\bullet\) Potential leakage of customer information \(\bullet\) using private data to deduce personal habits and behaviours of the home’s occupants |  F27 | \(\bullet\) Outage of the power grid \(\bullet\) poor power quality |
F13 | \(\bullet\) Monetary losses for individual victims \(\bullet\) system’s instability leading to price and demand fluctuations \(\bullet\) regional blackouts |  F28 | \(\bullet\) Dropped loads \(\bullet\) disconnection of utility power at consumer ends |
F14 | \(\bullet\) Wasted energy \(\bullet\) increased transmission cost \(\bullet\) energy outages \(\bullet\) imbalance of energy supply \(\bullet\) invalid energy links \(\bullet\) isolation of nodes from the grid in terms of energy supply and demand) | Â F29 | \(\bullet\) The heat energy generated over long time duration could lead to serious damage to system components \(\bullet\) serious threats to system stability and human safety |
F15 | \(\bullet\) Destabilization of the electrical network leading to a complete blackout \(\bullet\) large areas without electrical energy \(\bullet\) lack of communications \(\bullet\) lack of heating in the winter \(\bullet\) significant economic losses | Â F30 | \(\bullet\) Unexpected downtime \(\bullet\) economic losses |